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PATRIOTISM:
DO WE KNOW IT WHEN WE SEE IT?
A. Wallace Tashima*

COUNTRY. By Eric L. Muller. Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press. 2001. Pp. xx, 229. $27.50.

FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR

In a small, triangular plot, a short distance north of the Capitol in
Washington, D.C., is the recently dedicated "National Japanese
American Memorial to Patriotism." One of the primary purposes of
the memorial is. to recall publicly the forced removal of Japanese
Americans from the Pacific coast at the beginning of World War II
and their imprisonment in government internment camps for the dura
tion of the war.1 The incident is worth recalling, of course, if for no
other reason than as a constant reminder that we must not let a similar
tragedy befall any other group of Americans. But one is at a loss to
know why it is called a "Memorial to Patriotism."2 Is it patriotic to be
stripped of all of one's dignity and earthly possessions and forced into
exile/imprisonment solely because of one's race or ethnicity? Is it
patriotic for a citizen of this country to be regarded as the enemy
based on one's race alone? Is it an act of patriotism to bow to the
command of the President, literally enforced by the U.S. Army, when
there is no apparent alternative? That many Japanese Americans
evacuated by force from the West Coast choose to call their obedience
to that unconstitutional act patriotic sixty years later highlights the
schism within the Japanese-American community that Professor Eric
Muller3 explores in his book.
This modest volume that expands on a footnote to history can be
read on several different levels. It tells the story of a small group of
Japanese American men of draft age who, out of their understanding
of patriotism, defied the draft and of the consequences they knowingly
faced. The evacuation and internment of all persons of Japanese
ancestry, citizens as well as aliens, from the Pacific coast at the start of
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
A.B. 1958, U.C.L.A.; LLB. 1961, Harvard. The reviewer was interned in the Poston, Ari
zona, Relocation Center from May 1942 to August 1945. - Ed.

1. Executive Order 9066, the legal authority for the internment, was issued by the Presi
dent on February 19, 1942. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
2. The memorial also honors the 800 Nisei soldiers killed in action in World War II, pp.
197-98, and, certainly to that extent, it is a fitting memorial to patriotism.
3. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
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World War II is a well-known episode of our recent past. Professor
Muller does not go into detail, but he provides some of that back
ground and the historical context of the evacuation and internment.4
He then launches into his tale.
Shortly after World War II started, all draft-age Japanese
American men were reclassified into draft category 4-C, the category
reserved for enemy aliens and other undesirables, with the conse
quence that, despite their American citizenship, these men became
ineligible to be drafted into the armed forces. The leading "civil
rights" organization for Japanese Americans was (and still is) the
Japanese American Citizens League ("JACL"). 5 After it became in
evitable that Japanese Americans would be removed from the Pacific
Coast, the JACL, instead of protesting the evacuation as unconstitu
tional, urged full cooperation with the government. 6 It also lobbied the
War Department to permit Japanese Americans to serve in the mili
tary, believing that such service was the b.est available vehicle for
Japanese Americans to regain· their rights as citizens (p. 42). As one
Pentagon official put it, the JACL "has been a good influence. It has
pursued a policy of full cooperation with the War Department and
other federal agencies" (p. 63). Indeed, Professor Muller goes so far as
to characterize Mike Masaoka, one of the wartime leaders of the
JACL, as a "collaborator . . . with many of the wartime government's
anti-Nikkei policies. . . . " (p. 198).
The JACL was successful in these efforts and Japanese Americans
were again reclassified, this time as draft-eligible. It was, however,
unsuccessful in its efforts to have Nisei soldiers placed in "general
assignments," that is, assigned throughout the army, in the same
manner as any other soldiers, as the need arose. After a Jong internal
struggle within the War Department, the government determined that
Nisei would serve in segregated combat units, rather than being inte
grated into existing units. One of the important considerations, of
course, was the difficulty of explaining how the army could "possibly

4. The historical background and legal basis of the evacuation are treated in some detail
in the Supreme Court cases which considered the constitutionality of various aspects of the
evacuation and internment, and the curfew that preceded it. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81 (1943). In coram nobis proceedings more than 40 years later, the factual basis of the
order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast, as represented to
the Supreme Court by the Solicitor General in the government's brief, was called into seri
ous question. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp.
1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
5.

See

http://www.jacl.org (JACL's website).

6. To its credit, the JACL did support the legal challenges to the evacuation and in
ternment in the form of amicus curiae briefs in both the Korematsu and Hirabayashi cases
before the Supreme Court, as well as in Yasui v United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
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integrate the Nisei while simultaneously segregating black soldiers" (p.
62). As one general observed, the "general assignment of the Nisei
would inevitably draw attention to the continued segregation of blacks
in the army" (pp. 60-62). Those young Japanese-American men who
answered their country's call by serving distinguished themselves on
the field of battle. The segregated, all-Japanese 442nd Regimental
Combat Team compiled a record of heroism unmatched in the annals
of American military history by any unit of comparable size. As
President Truman stated in his address to the returning soldiers of the
442nd: ·
You fought not only the· enemy, bur you fought prejudice - and you
won. Keep up the fight, and we will continue to win·- to make this great
republic stand for just what the Constitution says. it stands for: the wel
fare of all of the people all of the time. (p. 198)

A few young men, however, concluded that it was unjust for them
to be drafted into the military to protect American democracy while
they and their families were· being held under armed guard, behind
barbed wire, their status as prisoners resting on nothing less (and
nothing more) than a purely racial classification (pp. 83-84). They
either refused to report for their preinduction physical examinations
or refused to step forward to take the oath when their names were
called at the draft induction centers. Inevitably, 'these men were
charged with refusing to report for induction into the armed forces of
the United States, in violation of the Selective Service Act.7
After giving us an account of the turmoil within the internment
camps on the issue of serving in the army,8 Professor Muller takes us
through several .of those trials. His chronicle of those trials richly
demonstrates the rampant racism that was the order of the day in
America at that time, a much-lowered expectation of the meaning of
"due process,'' again consistent with the times, and the power that a
United States district judge exereises over the case before him.
The Heart Mountain, Wyoming Relocation Center draft resisters
were tried in the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming, in Cheyenne. After waivers of jury trials, all 63 draft resist
ers were tried en masse before Judge T. Blake Kennedy. On a well
documented basis (pp. 104-07), Professor Muller brands Judge
Kennedy as an out-and-out racist (p.· 104). On the first day of trial,
Judge Kennedy referred to the defendants as "you Jap. boys" (p. 104).
Unsurprisingly, all 63 defendants were convicted and each was
sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment (p. 113). Judge
·

7. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940) (expired 1947).
8. Pp. 41-99. The navy continued to refuse to accept Japanese Americans into its ranks.
P. 47.
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Kennedy's personal afterwords help explain his justification for those
harsh sentences:
Personally this Court feels that the defendants have made a serious mis
take in arriving at their conclusions which brought about these criminal
prosecutions. If they are truly loyal American citizens they should, at
least when they have become recognized as such, embrace the opportu
nity to discharge the duties of citizens by offering themselves in the cause
of our National defense.9

The cases of the Minidoka, Idaho Relocation Center draft resisters
were tried in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho,
in Boise. If Judge Kennedy was an out-and-out racist, the xenophobia
of the district judge who presided over the Minidoka cases was even
more pronounced. Chase A. Clark had been the governor of Idaho be
fore his appointment to the district court two years earlier. As gover
nor, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, Clark's suggestion of
what to do about the Japanese in America - what he called the
"Jap problem" - was to "[s]end them all back to Japan, then sink the
island" {p. 125; alteration in original). At a conference of western gov
ernors, called by the then-director of the War Relocation Authority,
Milton Eisenhower, Governor Clark engaged in a vicious diatribe
against Japanese Americans, admitting right from the start "that I am
so prejudiced that my reasoning might be a little off.... . " He
concluded his remarks by urging that any "Japanese who may be sent
[to Idaho] be placed under guard and confined in concentration camps
for the safety of our people, our State, and the Japanese themselves"
(p. 33; alteration in original). No one fully realized then the accuracy
of his foreboding prediction. It apparently never crossed Judge Clark's
mind that he ought to recuse himself for bias and prejudice against the
defendants, or even for the sake of the appearance of impartiality (pp.
126-27).
Other shortcomings pervaded the trial. The level of representation
afforded the defendants by court-appointed counsel, as demonstrated
by Muller, fell woefully short of even the most crabbed definition of
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective representation of counsel.
Some of the appointed defense counsel refused even to consult with
their clients (pp. 125-26). Judge Clark also instituted his own version
of a "rocket docket," in which justice itself was the victim of speed and
efficiency. Judge Clark conducted 33 jury trials over an 11-day period.
He was able to do so only by having the same 34 jurors serve in
"slightly different configuration[s] of twelve" for all 33 cases. As
Professor Muller states, "by the time all of the trials were completed,
virtually all of the jurors had served on at least ten separate juries"
(pp. 128-29). The longer jury "deliberations" lasted all of a few
9. United States v. Fujii, 55 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Wyo. 1944).
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minutes; some juries merely filed out, turned around, and returned
with their guilty verdicts (p. 128). Any semblance of an impartial jury,
open-mindedness, and lack of prejudgment was abandoned. Chal
lenges to the venire on account of possible prejudice fell on deaf ears
(p. 129). All but one of the defendants were convicted.10 Those that
went to trial (a few others had entered pleas of guilty) were sentenced
to three years and three months of imprisonment (p. 129).
Similar trials and ensuing convictions were repeated throughout
the western states where the internment camps were located. Only the
trial in the Northern District of California ended with unexpected
results. The draft resisters from the Tule Lake, California Segregation
Center were tried before Judge Louis E. Goodman, at the Eureka
Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California. The defendants had moved to quash the indictment on
the ground that they were deprived of their liberty without due proc
ess "by virtue of the circumstances" of their confinement at Tule Lake
(p. 143). Concluding that "[i]t is shocking to the conscience that an
American citizen be confined on the ground of disloyalty, and then,
while so under duress and restraint, be compelled to serve in the
armed forces, or be prosecuted for not yielding to such compulsion,"
Judge Goodman granted the motion to quash and dismissed the
proceedings.11 In further justification of his ruling, Judge Goodman
observed:
The issue raised by this motion is without precedent. It must be resolved
in the light of the traditional and historic Anglo-American approach to
the time-honored doctrine of "due process." It must not give way to
overzealousness in an attempt to reach, via the criminal process, those
whom we may regard as undesirable citizens.12

As Professor Muller rightly points out, although long on equity
and fairness, Judge Goodman's opinion is woefully short on citation to
precedent or then-accepted norms of American constitutional doctrine
(p. 151). The opinion rested uneasily on the then-untested, and even
unrecognized, notion of substantive due process (pp. 146-48). It
antedated the Supreme Court's widespread introduction into constitu
tional law of the "shocks the conscience" doctrine by eight years.13

10. The single acquittal was because the defendant had never received an induction no
tice. He also was later convicted, after having been given notice to report for induction. Pp.
129, 213 n.63.
11. United States v. Kuwabara, 56 F. Supp. 716, 719 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
12.

Id.

13. Pp. 149-50; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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For reasons lost in history, the Department of Justice did not
appeal Kuwabara.14 If it had been appealed, it surely would have been
reversed. In United States v. Takeguma,15 which involved an appeal
from the draft-resisting convictions originating in the Poston, Arizona
Relocation Center, the Ninth Circuit made short shrift of Kuwabara,
noting tersely that "[w]herein the reasoning of the Kuwabara opinion
differs with that of this opinion, it may be taken that we are not in
accord therewith. "16
Professor Muller suggests that Judge Goodman's free-lancing
efforts to do justice are part of a long line of cases in which conscien
tious judges struggled with the tension between their sworn duty to
uphold the law and the injustice of enforcing an unjust law.17 In this
country, that struggle goes back at least as far as the Fugitive Slave
Act, which required northern judges to order the return of runaway
slaves to their owners. The problem persists through the present day,
however, with federal judges who oppose capital punishment wrestling
with their own consciences as they enforce what they believe to be
unjust laws that require the imposition of the death penalty (p. 153).
These young men were motivated by a somewhat-inchoate, but
nonetheless deep-rooted, sense of injustice, The burden of their cases,
and their cause, in their own words, as quoted by the Ninth Circuit,
was simple: "Although American citizens by birth, the defendants
[appellants] because of claimed war emergency have been treated as
alien enemies, interned as prisoners of war, solely because we have
been at war with the government where their ancestors were born."18
The Tenth Circuit's summary of the defendant's contention stated
similarly:
Appellant's entire appeal is predicated on the argument that his removal
from his home and his confinement behind barbed wire in the relocation
center without being charged with any crime deprived him of his liberty
and property without due process of law, and that therefore he ought not
be required to render military service until his rights were restored.19

We do not have to label these acts of resistance as "courageous" to
recognize that they were acts of conscience, committed with the
knowledge and acceptance of their harsh consequences. But these
14. Professor Muller engages in some speculation regarding the reasons for the decision
not to appeal Kuwahara, but grants that "it is impossible to know the full story" because the
Department of Justice's files of the case no longer exist. P. 157.
15. 156 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1946) (en bane).
16.

Takeguma, 156

17.
(1949).

See

18.
brief).

Takeguma,

F.2d at 441.

Lon L. Fuller,

The Case of the Speluncean Explorers,

62 HARV. L REV. 616

156 F.2d at 439 (alteration in original) (quoting appellants' opening

19. Fujii v. United States, 148 F.2d 298, 299 (10th Cir. 1945).
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individual acts of conscience take on a dimension of courage when one
pauses to reflect on the widespread approbation the draft resisters
faced within the Japanese-American community. The culture of the
Japanese-American community, instilled by the first-generation eld
ers, was obedience and submission to and respect for authority. This
culture of conformity was reinforced by the JACL's policy of coopera
tion with the government in carrying out the evacuation and intern
ment and its express pro-draft stance. These acts of resistance also
antedated the rise of the modern notion of passive resistance, popu
larized by Mahatma Gandhi a decade later. They also preceded the
acceptance of civil disobedience that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
impressed upon the American conscience a generation later. None
theless, these young men persisted.
Judge William Denman, of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
confronted the morally-troubling dilemma that these convictions
posed for some judges of conscience in his concurring opinion in
Takeguma, which affirmed the Poston Relocation Center draft-resister
convictions. Judge Denman's short, concurring opinion is worth
quoting in full:
I concur in the opinion and its reasoning.
In addition, I feel that these young men should be considered by the ex
ecutive as the subject of its clemency. They were United States citizens
and only attempted to give up their citizenship after a continued illegal
imprisonment by the Federal Government in barbed wire enclosures,
guarded by armed soldiers, under conditions of great oppression and
humiliation. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243.
Had any one of us been so wrongfully imprisoned in our youth because
our parents had emigrated to this country from, say, Germany, England,
or Ireland, with which there might be a war, it cannot be said that our
exasperation and shame would not have caused 'us to prefer the citizen
ship of our parents' homeland. It was because the United States first cru
elly wronged us by an illegal if not criminal imprisonment that our re
nunciation came. Even if, in our justifiable resentment, we committed
acts adverse to the continuance of the war against our fatherland, it is for
the United States, the first and greater wrongdoer, to be merciful.
Because our skins are white and our origin is European, is no ground for
a distinction between our youth and that of these appellants.20

Apparently, none of the other judges of the Ninth Circuit, sitting en
bane, felt a sufficient sense of moral outrage to join in Judge
Denman's opinion.
The following year, a presidentially established amnesty board,
headed by retired Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, recom
mended, inter alia, that the Japanese-American draft resisters be
20.

Takeguma, 156

F.2d at 442 (Denman, J., concurring).
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granted pardons, including the full restoration of their civil rights.
President Truman accepted that recommendation and, on December
24, 1947, granted the recommended pardons.21
Still, these men could not gain acceptance in their own community.
For years running into decades, the JACL struggled with reconciling
its own past of collaborating with the government's efforts and the
antithetical acts of the draft resisters, which undermined the JACL's
position. It repeatedly turned down efforts from its more progressive
members, including a proposal from the 442nd Veterans Club of
Oahu, Hawaii, that a formal apology be extended to the draft resisters.
It was not until 2000, more than a half century later, that the JACL
finally formally apologized to the draft resisters for the manner in
which it had treated them (pp. 182-86). But the schism remains. As
Professor Muller notes, "[s]adly, even as the Nisei generation that
fought on the battlefields of Europe and in the courtrooms of the
American West now dies out, the rancor and bitterness of their own
internal disagreement live on" (p. 186).
Given this history, Senator Daniel K. Inouye's acknowledgment
that "it took just as much courage and valor and patriotism to stand up
to our government and say 'you are wrong,' " as it did to volunteer for
military service, is an important step toward reconciliation (p. xi).
Senator Inouye, himself a highly decorated veteran of the 442nd
Regimental Combat Team,22 is a revered figure among Nisei veterans
of World War II, particularly those who served with him in the 442nd.
Thus, his Foreword to Professor Muller's book is, itself, an important
statement. Perhaps, reflection on Senator lnouye's Foreword,
particularly his closing thought, will help bring closure to both sides of
this debate: "I am glad that there were some who had the courage to
express some of the feelings that we who volunteered harbored deep
in our souls" (p. xi).
Professor Muller's book is not only a worthy record of these little
remembered events, but makes an important contribution towards
reconciling the Japanese-American community, as well as the larger
community, with its past.
This book is also worth reading on another level, in light of the le
gal problems that are likely to come to the forefront in this post-9/11,
war-against-terrorism, world. Professor Muller's account reminds us of
the crucial role that federal district judges play as the first line of
defense of our Constitution. We see that the federal district court is
the stage upon which both the majesty of the Constitution and the
failures of the rule of law are vividly displayed.
21. Pp.181-82, 216 n.5 (citing, inter alia, Proclamation No. 2762, 12 Fed. Reg. 8731 (Dec.
23, 1947)).
22. Senator Inouye was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the nation's high
est military decoration, for his battlefield actions in Italy.
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Federal trial judges exercise almost unchallenged power over the
cases pending before them. In these draft-resister cases, the judgments
ranged from acquittals to sentences of a few months to five years'
imprisonment. In one case, the draft resisters, upon conviction, were
sentenced to pay a fine of one cent (p. 192 n.14). As one of the leaders
of the draft-resister movement commented, "Gee, what in the hell is
the matter with this justice system? It doesn't make sense. The charge
is the same, identical" (p. 192).
The federal judges who presided over these trials likely repre
sented a fair cross-section of the federal judiciary of the day. Some
were so biased and prejudiced that, by any objective measure, they
should have recused themselves from participating in the cases. Others
strove to conform their judgments to a higher ideal than that embod
ied in the positive law they· were sworn to uphold. All surely saw
themselves as fair-minded judges who applied the law fairly and even
handedly.
But all were the product of their time and place. And, at that time,
overt racism was an accepted part of American life and law, and
nativism and xenophobia played an important part in the politics of
the American West. It is no wonder then that, for most of these draft
resisters, their convictions and harsh sentences were a foregone
conclusion. These "fap boys" got exactly what they deserved, and
what the public expected, under the standards of justice that then
prevailed in the American West. It is to their credit that a few judges
rose above their time and place to see the injustice of the strict and
harsh application of the criminal sanctions of the Selective Service Act
to these young men and recognized that, if not acquittal, mitigation
and clemency were called for.
Today the cast in the federal courtroom has changed, but, like the
stage itself, the scenarios remains familiar. In this post-9/11 world,
many of the themes played out in this book will surely be played out
again. The federal judiciary will again be called upon to protect the
values embodied in our Constitution from overreaching government
attempts to run roughshod over them.
Professor Muller's book is also worth reading in this light, as a
thoughtful examination of one of those interstices where the rule of
law struggles to coexist with morality and justice, and federal judges
struggle to uphold their sworn duty and to do justice. It is a revisit
worth making.

